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NOTE 
Deciding Where to Draw the Line: 
Compactness as a Protection Against 
Gerrymandering in Missouri Redistricting 
Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
STEPHANIE BRADSHAW* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years, the release of the U.S. Census triggers a tidal wave of 
political ramifications that ripple from coast to coast.  The census reflects the 
fluctuation in population among the states, necessitating a shuffling of, 
among other things, state legislative and congressional districts.
1
  States are 
awarded Congressional representatives based on their populations: the greater 
the population, the greater the representation.
2
  While some states gain repre-
sentatives and others lose them, the outcome is the same: districts must be 
redrawn.
3
  In what has been likened to a “periodic comet,” challenges by citi-
zens to this redistricting frequently arise.
4
  Behind this litigation is often the 
fear that the authorities entrusted with the task of producing district maps will 
abuse their discretion and, in a practice known as “gerrymandering,” draw 
districts that dilute the voting strength of particular groups.
5
  Article III, sec-
tion 45 of the Missouri Constitution contains a provision that acts to combat 




 * B.J., University of Missouri, 2009; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2014; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2013-14.  I 
would like to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Erin Hawley for her advice, in-
sight, and encouragement throughout the writing process. 
 1. See Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 
5025251, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: YOUR GUIDE TO CENSUS 
2010 REDISTRICTING DATA FROM THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/StrengthInNumbers2010.pdf [hereinafter STRENGTH 
IN NUMBERS]. 
 3. See Pearson v. Koster (Pearson I), 359 S.W.3d 35, 37 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 4. Radogno, 2011 WL 5025251, at *1. 
 5. See id. at *1-3; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2009) (gerrymander-
ing is defined as “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral       
districts . . . to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposi-
tion’s voting strength.”). 
 6. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45. 
1
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souri courts have consistently expressed the necessity of this “compactness 
requirement,” stating, “The protection of this constitutional provision applies 
to each Missouri voter, in every congressional district.  ‘No right is more 
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those 
who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.’”
7
  However, 
the effect of a century of redistricting litigation, culminating in the recent 
Supreme Court of Missouri case Pearson v. Koster, has been to weaken this 
provision rather than strengthen it.  In order to reinforce state protections 
against gerrymandering, Missouri courts must interpret this constitutional 
requirement in a way that ultimately holds redistricting authorities responsi-
ble for justifying gross deviations from the standard of compactness. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
With the release of the 2010 Census in early 2011 – and as a result of a 
slump in population growth compared to that of other states – Missouri      
lost one member of its delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives,    
reducing the number of Missouri representatives from nine to eight.
8
        
Pursuant to the state constitution, Missouri’s General Assembly (General 
Assembly) is vested with the duty to reevaluate, and subsequently redistrict, 
the state’s congressional districts.
9
  Article III, section 45 of the Missouri 
Constitution provides: 
When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled in 
the House of the Congress of the United States under the census . . . is 
certified to the governor, the general assembly shall by law divide the 
state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to 
which it is entitled, which districts shall be composed of contiguous 
territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.
10
 
Upon holding hearings throughout the state, the General Assembly approved 
the new congressional redistricting map (the Map) in April 2011, and it went 
into effect as part of House Bill 193.
11
  After surviving a veto by Governor 
Jay Nixon, the Map was officially adopted on May 4, 2011.
12
 
Following its release, two groups of plaintiffs immediately challenged 
the Map.
13
  Both groups sought the same outcome: that the court invalidate 
  
 7. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 39 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,   
441 (1992)). 
 8. Brief of the Appellant, Pearson v. Koster (Pearson II), 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc) (No. SC92326), 2012 WL 662844, at *1. 
 9. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 41-42. 
 10. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45. 
 11. Brief of the Appellant, supra note 8, at *2. 
 12. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38. 
 13. Id. 
2
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the Map to prevent the government from conducting elections under its 
framework and, ultimately, that the General Assembly draw a new map to 
take its place.
14
  The “Pearson plaintiffs” and the “McClatchey plaintiffs”
15
 
(collectively referred to as Plaintiffs) filed separate petitions contesting the 
validity of the Map.
16
  Both actions were filed in the Circuit Court of Cole 
County in Jefferson City.
17
  Naming Attorney General Chris Koster and Sec-
retary of State Robin Carnahan as defendants, the Pearson plaintiffs alleged 
several claims, chief among which was the assertion that the Map failed to 
meet the constitutional standard that districts be as compact as may be.
18
  The 
McClatchey plaintiffs, who named Carnahan as the sole defendant, also took 
issue with the compactness of the Map’s districts.
19
  Specifically, Plaintiffs 
alleged that districts 3 and 5 were “particularly suspect” due to the meander-
ing nature of their boundary lines.
20
  Plaintiffs characterized this lack of com-
pactness as an attempt at political gerrymandering by the General Assem-
bly.
21
  Defendants Koster, Carnahan, and intervening defendants State Repre-
sentative John J. Diehl and State Senator Scott T. Rupp
22
 (collectively re-
ferred to as Defendants) responded by filing motions to dismiss or, in the 
  
 14. Id.  Although Plaintiffs did not specifically demand that a new map be 
drawn, if they had received their requested relief a new map would have naturally 
followed.  See Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 437 (Mo. 1955) (en banc) (order-
ing the redistricting authority, upon a finding that the prior map was unconstitutional, 
to create new, valid districts). 
 15. The Pearson plaintiffs are Kenneth Pearson, Joan Bray, Timothy Brown, 
Mildred Conner, Brian Murphy, and Phoebe Ottomeyer.  The McClatchey plaintiffs 
are Stan McClatchey, Ivan Griffin, Laura Meeks, Patricia Smith, Molly Teichmann, 
Donna Turk, and Matt Ullman. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 42 n.1 (Mo. 2012)         
(en banc). 
 16. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 40.  In addition to their compactness claim, the Pearson plaintiffs also 
presented additional claims to the trial court.  These claims include: that the Map 
violated Article I, sections 1 and 2 of the Missouri Constitution in that it “deprives 
equal protection of rights” and is not “instituted solely for the good of the whole.”  Id. 
at 40-42. 
 19. Id. at 40.  Like the Pearson plaintiffs, the McClatchey plaintiffs also present-
ed other claims, including the argument that the Map “reflects bipartisan gerryman-
dering.”  Id. 
 20. Id.; see also id. at 43 app. A. 
 21. See Brief of Appellants, Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
(No. SC92200), 2011 WL 7005504, at *12 (alleging that the General Assembly’s 
merger of highly urban areas with highly rural areas to create district 5 was “an act of 
political gerrymandering”). 
 22. Diehl and Rupp intervened in their capacity as chairs of the redistricting 
committees for the House and Senate, respectively.  Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 42 
n.2 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
3
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alternative, for judgment on the pleadings.
23
  After oral arguments, the court 
entered an order dismissing both cases.
24
  Plaintiffs subsequently appealed to 





 the supreme court consolidated the two cases, officially 
merging the Pearson plaintiffs and the McClatchey plaintiffs into a single 
group.
27
  Reviewing Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the districts’ compactness, the 
court stated that the evaluation should be limited to an objective inquiry: 
whether, under the evidence presented, the districts actually comply with the 
constitutional mandate that they be “as compact . . . as may be.”
28
  In articu-
lating this objective standard, the court expressly rejected the proposition that 
good faith, or lack thereof, by the General Assembly should have any bearing 
on the analysis.
29
  The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Plain-
tiffs’ claims regarding the compactness of the Map’s districts.
30
  However, 
the court did not make any factual determinations, instead stating, “It is a 
question of fact, yet to be tried” whether the districts meet the standard of 
compactness.
31
  Consequently, the court remanded the case to the trial court 
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
32
  On re-
mand, both Plaintiffs and Defendants presented evidence regarding the com-
pactness of the challenged districts.
33
  Once more, the trial court entered 
judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiffs had failed to show 
that the districts did not meet the standard of compactness.
34
  The court em-
phasized that the requirement does not necessitate absolute precision.
35
  
Plaintiffs again appealed to the supreme court.
36
 
The supreme court took up Plaintiffs’ second appeal in the instant case.  
In Pearson II,
37
 Plaintiffs asserted that “the trial court’s judgments erroneous-
ly interpret the constitutional standard for compactness and . . . the judgments 
  
 23. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 38. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 42. 
 26. The court refers to Plaintiffs’ first appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri 
as “Pearson I.”  This terminology will be used throughout. 
 27. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 42. 
 28. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40. 
 29. Id. at 39-40. 
 30. Id. at 40. 
 31. Id.  The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ other claims.  
See id. at 40-43.  For discussion of these additional claims, see supra notes 18-19. 
 32. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 43. 
 33. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. While the court does not use this terminology in its opinion, for purposes of 
clarity the instant case will be referred to as “Pearson II” throughout. 
4
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are against the weight of the evidence.”
38
  The court focused on the language 
of the compactness provision, again setting forth an objective standard and 
rejecting the argument that good faith by the legislature is a relevant consid-
eration.
39
  Affirming the trial court’s judgment, the court found that it “did 
not erroneously declare the meaning of ‘as compact . . . as may be’” under the 
constitution and that – deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact – Plaintiffs 
failed to prove that the Map violated this standard.
40
  Like the trial court, the 
supreme court stressed that the compactness standard is not a provision that 
can be met with complete accuracy.
41
  Instead, the court emphasized that 
“mandatory and permissible recognized factors can impact the configuration 
of district boundaries,” including natural and historical boundary lines and the 
boundaries of political subdivisions.
42
  The court held that the Map did not 
contravene Article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution because the 
irregular shapes of the contested districts were the result of such permissible 
factors.
43
  Therefore, the Map was enforceable.
44
 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
As was the case in Pearson II, issues of redistricting typically arise in 
the wake of the release of the U.S. Census.  Every ten years, the U.S. Census 
Bureau, a subdivision of the U.S. Department of Commerce, conducts a na-
tionwide census.
45
  Questionnaires delivered to households across the nation 
generate a slew of data, measuring the population of cities, counties, and 
states.
46
  These statistics perform various functions, one of which is to ensure 
that legislative districts, both on the state and federal levels, reflect their re-
spective population numbers.
47
  Article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, 
establishing the census, states in pertinent part: 
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this union, according to their respective 
Numbers . . . .  The actual enumeration shall be made within three 
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and 
  
 38. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 41. 
 39. Id. at 46. 
 40. Id. at 47-48, 51. 
 41. Id. at 41. 
 42. Id. at 41, 50. 
 43. Id. at 51.  
 44. See id. at 41. 
 45. STRENGTH IN NUMBERS, supra note 2, at 1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 3. 
5
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within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they 
shall by Law direct.
48
 
Thus, the release of new census data necessitates the redrawing of district 
lines.
49
  The authority charged with performing this redistricting varies de-
pending on whether districts are being drawn for state or federal legislative 
purposes.
50
  In cases of federal legislative redistricting in Missouri, the Gen-
eral Assembly is vested with the power to divide the state into districts.
51
  
However, as a result of this power, new maps often give rise to a fear that the 
General Assembly will abuse its discretion and draw districts that work to 
weaken the vote of particular groups, specifically the minority political par-
ty.
52
  This tactic, known as political gerrymandering, is “[t]he practice of di-
viding a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular 




Due to these concerns, legislative power in matters of redistricting is not 
absolute; both the federal government and state constitutional provisions 
place limits on the discretion of the General Assembly in making its appor-
tionments.
54
  In analyzing the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding in Pear-
son II, it is important to examine not only Missouri’s constitutional provisions 
and judicial precedent, but also the standard imposed by the federal courts.  
Part A of this section will discuss the federal standard, in particular the “one 
person, one vote” principle established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Wesberry v. Sanders.
55
  Part B will explore a century of Missouri redistricting 
  
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 49. See, e.g., Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 1:11-CV-04884, 2011 WL 
5025251, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 50. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 45 (directing that congressional redistricting be 
performed by the General Assembly); MO. CONST. art. III, § 7 (directing that state 
legislative redistricting be performed by specially-appointed commissions). 
 51. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45.  It should be noted that state House and Senate 
redistricting is not performed by the General Assembly; rather, such redistricting is 
effectuated by commissions appointed by the governor.  Id. art. III, § 7.  However, 
these commissions are still bound by a requirement that districts be “as compact . . . 
as may be.”  Id. art. III, § 5.  Missouri courts have interpreted all of the state constitu-
tion’s compactness provisions in the same manner.  See infra Part III.B.1-2. 
 52. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of the Constitutional “Com-
pactness Requirement” to Redistricting, in 114 A.L.R. 5TH 311, 323-24 (West 2003). 
 53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2009).  The type of gerrymandering 
that is referenced here, and will be referenced throughout, is political gerrymandering.  
Racial gerrymandering, or the dilution of minority voting strength, is not the focus of 
this Note. 
 54. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323. 
 55. See infra Part III.A. 
6
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precedent, examining both the evolution of the compactness requirement and 
the expanding scope of legislative discretion.
56
 
A.  “One Person, One Vote” 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to impose re-
strictions on legislative redistricting power.
57
  In 1964, the Court handed 
down two landmark decisions, establishing that both federal congressional 
districts and state legislative districts must be apportioned on the basis of 
population.
58
  This standard is founded on the principle of “one person, one 
vote,” advanced by the Court in its decision in Wesberry v. Sanders.
59
  In 
Wesberry, which arose as a result of inequality of population among Geor-
gia’s congressional districts, the Court stated that the aim of Article I, section 
2 of the Constitution was to “mak[e] equal representation for equal numbers 
of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.”
60
  In par-
ticular, the Court declared that the Constitution’s directive that “[t]he House 
of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen . . . by the People 
of the several States” means that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote 
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”
61
 
Less than four months later, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims confirmed 
that this standard of population equality extended to state legislative districts 
as well.
62
  In response to a dispute regarding the apportionment of Alabama’s 
legislature, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment demanded that state legislative seats be assigned on the basis of 
population.
63
  The Court also declared that this apportionment must be made 
in good faith.
64
  The Court stated: 
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a 
state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis, we mean 
that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest 
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legisla-




 56. See infra Part III.B. 
 57. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323. 
 58. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 569 (1964). 
 59. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8, 18. 
 60. Id. at 2-3, 18. 
 61. Id. at 4, 7-8; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 62. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. 
 63. Id. at 536-37, 568. 
 64. Id. at 577. 
 65. Id. 
7
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Thus, the Court in Reynolds emphasized that not only must districts be 
apportioned to achieve population equality, but that the subjective intent of 
the authority charged with redistricting is relevant.
66
  This good faith standard 
plays an important role in the adjudication of redistricting challenges, as fed-
eral courts utilize a burden-shifting framework to ensure that districts are not 
drawn arbitrarily.
67
  If a plaintiff asserting unconstitutional population dis-
parities among districts shows that the legislature did not make a good faith 
effort to achieve equality, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that 
there was a reasonable basis for the variance.
68
  Some states also incorporate 
a good faith standard in cases of redistricting.
69
  Although not mandated by 
any state constitutional provision, courts in Iowa, New Jersey, and Maryland 
have, upon a showing of “noncompactness,” required the state legislature to 
justify deviations from compactness.
70
  Missouri courts have declined to em-
ploy such a framework.
71
 
As a result of this “one person, one vote” principle, redistricting          
authorities are required to consider population equality when drawing new 
districts.
72
  In addition, under Reynolds, deviations from this standard must  
be made in good faith.
73
  This requirement ultimately acts to curb the power 
of these authorities in their redistricting efforts.  Yet, other than the standard 
of population equality, federal courts provide little protection against the  
unreasonable exercise of legislative discretion.
74
  In 2004, a plurality of      
the U.S. Supreme Court held that claims of political gerrymandering were 
nonjusticiable because such claims lack “judicially discernible and          
  
 66. See id. 
 67. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 46 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 
730-31 (1983)).  
 68. Id. 
 69. See In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 789-90 
(Iowa 1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 262 A.2d 389, 395 (N.J. 1970); In re Legislative 
Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 306, 324 (Md. 2002). 
 70. In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 791; Jackman, 
262 A.2d at 395; In re Legislative Districting of the State, 805 A.2d at 305. 
 71. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 46. 
 72. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 568 (1964).  In addition, the Voting Rights Act imposes a federal statutory limi-
tation on legislative redistricting, prohibiting the drawing of districts that dilute mi-
nority voting strength.  Kemper, supra note 52, at 323.  The Act states that a violation 
is established if “it is shown that the political processes . . . are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens [on account of race or color] in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”  Voting Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1763(b) (2006). 
 73. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. 
 74. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 
(2006) (plurality opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
8
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manageable standards” for adjudication.
75
  This decision, which was subse-
quently upheld, has thus left the federal courts with little power to provide 
redress in cases of gerrymandering.
76
  Consequently, federal limitations       
on legislative discretion are fairly minimal.  However, a number of states – 




B.  The Missouri Compactness Requirement 
While Missouri’s congressional redistricting provision emphasizes 
equality of population, it also instructs the General Assembly to consider an 
additional criterion: compactness.
78
  Article III, section 45 of the Missouri 
Constitution articulates the compactness requirement, stating that districts 
must be “composed of contiguous territory as compact . . . as may be.”
79
  
Like the standard of population equality required under the U.S. Constitution, 
the standard of compactness helps to ensure that districts are not drawn arbi-
trarily and, therefore, that each person’s vote carries equal weight.
80
  Missouri 
courts have communicated the importance of this standard, stating, “The pro-
tection of this constitutional provision applies to each Missouri voter, in every 
congressional district.  ‘No right is more precious in a free country than that 
of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as 
good citizens, we must live.’”
81
 
A standard of compactness was first inserted into the Missouri Constitu-
tion as an effort to prevent the partisan drawing of district boundaries.
82
  As 
the Supreme Court of Missouri stated, the purpose of the compactness re-
quirement was “to guard, as far as practicable, under the system of represen-
tation adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known as the ‘gerryman-
der,’ and to require the Legislature to form districts, not only of contiguous, 
but of compact or closely united, territory.”
83
  And despite the fact that this 
standard appeared for the first time in Missouri’s Constitution of 1875 and 
has subsequently been subject to several amendments, the language has re-
  
 75. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281. 
 76. See id.; League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 413-14 (holding 
claims of political gerrymandering nonjusticiable, stating that a dispute still existed 
over which substantive standard to apply). 
 77. Kemper, supra note 52, at 323. 
 78. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323-24. 
 81. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)). 
 82. See State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 (Mo. 1912). 
 83. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 315         
(Ill. 1895)). 
9
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mained markedly similar over time.
84
  This continuity highlights the im-
portance of the provision in guarding against gerrymandering, implying, as 
the Supreme Court of Missouri has held, that it is “necessary to the preserva-
tion of true representative government.”
85
 
For more than a century, Missouri courts have grappled with their inter-
pretation of the “as compact . . . as may be” standard.
86
  Among states that 
require districts to be as compact as possible, two distinct definitions of 
“compactness” have emerged: compactness of physical shape or size and 
compactness as “closely united territory.”
87
  Missouri courts have adopted the 
latter definition.
88
  While the definition of “compact” is well settled, court 
interpretation of the provision has demonstrated that the “closely united terri-
tory” standard is not the end of the analysis.
89
  Even if a plaintiff proves that a 
map does not meet this standard, the map may yet be valid as a reasonable 
exercise of the legislature’s power to draw district boundaries.
90
  State ex. rel 
Barrett v. Hitchcock and its descendants make clear that departures from the 
notion of compactness, as long as they can be reasonably justified, are square-
ly within the discretion of the legislature.
91
 
1.  State ex. rel Barrett v. Hitchcock 
In State ex. rel Barrett v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court of Missouri first 
gave meaning to the term “compact” as it pertains to Missouri’s constitutional 
redistricting clause.
92
  At issue in Barrett were the now-defunct redistricting 
provisions, which stated in pertinent part: 
Sec. 5. . . . For the election of Senators the State shall be divided into 
convenient districts, as nearly equal in population as may be[.]  
. . . . 
  
 84. Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Mo.1955) (en banc); see MO. 
CONST. art. III, § 45; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 9. 
 85. Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).  
 86. The first Missouri case to analyze the meaning of the redistricting “compact-
ness” standard, State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, was decided in 1912.  146 S.W. at 
61-62.  Barrett addressed the reapportionment of the state’s senatorial districts.  Id.   
at 48. 
 87. Kemper, supra note 52, at 324. 
 88. See Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61.  
 89. See Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 424-25; Priesler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, 
554-55 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); Doherty, 365 S.W.2d at 433-34; Barrett, 146 S.W.      
at 61. 
 90. See Barrett, 146 S.W. at 62. 
 91. See Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 425; Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d at 555; Doherty, 
284 S.W.2d at 433-35; Barrett, 146 S.W. at 62-65.  
 92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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Sec. 9. . . . When any Senatorial district shall be composed of two or 
more counties, they shall be contiguous; such districts to be as com-




The plaintiff, Barrett, took issue with senatorial redistricting that had 
been performed by a committee comprised of the governor, secretary of state, 
and attorney general.
94
  Barrett filed suit against the judges of the Circuit 
Court of the City of St. Louis, alleging that the new map had produced “great 
inequalities” in population between several St. Louis districts and seeking a 
writ of mandamus requiring the judges to divide the city into senatorial dis-
tricts “of compact and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as 
may be, as is provided by law.”
95
  The court held the redistricting plan uncon-




According to the court in Barrett, two duties had been delegated to the 
legislature: making each district “as nearly equal in population . . . as may be” 
and making each district “as compact as it can reasonably be made.”
97
  The 
language of these provisions made it clear that the legislature was able to 
exercise limited discretion when executing these duties.
98
  In defining “com-
pact,” the court stated that it “means ‘closely united,’ and that the provision 
that districts shall be formed of contiguous and compact territory means that 
the counties . . . when combined to form a district, must not only touch each 
other, but must be closely united territory.”
99
  Although the court did not oth-
erwise describe what makes territory “closely united,” in analyzing the shape 
of the districts it indicated that physical boundaries were an important consid-
eration in determining compactness.
100
  Applying these principles to the rele-
vant facts, the court determined that “the Legislature, in apportioning the state 
  
 93. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, §§ 5, 9 (emphasis added). 
 94. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 41-43.  Under the Missouri Constitution, it was the duty 
of the state legislature to reapportion the state’s senatorial districts.  MO. CONST. of 
1875, art. IV, § 7.  However, the General Assembly adjourned before performing this 
duty.  Barrett, 146 S.W. at 41.  In this situation, the constitution delegated the burden 
of redistricting to the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general.  MO. CONST. 
of 1875, art. IV, § 7.  As the court emphasized that this delegation “constitute[d] a 
legislative body” under these facts, hereinafter they will be referred to as “the legisla-
ture.”  Barrett, 146 S.W. at 48. 
 95. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 42-43.  This duty was imposed upon the court by section 
6 of Article IV of the state constitution.  MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 6. 
 96. See Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61-65. 
 97. Id. at 53; see MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, §§ 5, 9. 
 98. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 53. 
 99. Id. at 61 (emphasis added) (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 
40 N.E. 307, 315 (Ill. 1895)). 
 100. Id. at 56. 
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into districts, wholly disregarded the constitutional mandates as to compact-
ness of territory and equality in population.”
101
  
In reaching this conclusion, the court made it clear that while the Mis-
souri Constitution gives some discretion to the General Assembly in matters 
of redistricting, that discretion is not absolute.
102
  While the redistricting au-
thority may deviate from the standards enunciated in the constitution, the 
reasons for such a departure must be reasonably justifiable.
103
  The court stat-
ed, “Any departure from the limitation of equality in population must be 
made for the sake of securing greater compactness, and any departure from 
the limitation of compactness must be made for the purpose of securing 
greater equality in population.”
104
  However, after examining the populations 
of the districts in conjunction with their shapes, the court found that the larg-
est discrepancies in population were between the districts that were the least 
compact.
105
  The court emphasized that, as the implementation of the objec-
tive standard of compactness was necessarily subject to the discretion of 
those charged with redistricting, it was important to regulate legislative 
whims.
106
  The court explained: 
[I]t was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to confer 
upon the Legislature the unlimited power and discretion to form the 
districts in such shapes and dimensions as it might, in its own opinion, 
deem proper, nor to give to each a population which it deemed best.
107
 
2.  The Preisler Cases 
Following Barrett, the courts were largely silent until a flurry of litiga-
tion erupted following the decennial censuses of 1950, 1960, and 1970.  The 
cases arising from these proceedings – Preisler v. Doherty, Preisler v. 
Hearnes, and Preisler v. Kirkpatrick – served to further delineate the scope of 
legislative discretion permitted in Missouri redistricting and the factors that 
bear on compactness.
108
  As a result of the constitutionally-mandated power 
  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 54. 
 103. Id. at 55. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 56. 
 106. Id. at 54. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See generally Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), 
overruled by Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2012); Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 
552 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Mo. 1955) (en 
banc). These three cases were initiated by Paul W. Preisler, a St. Louis lawyer, activ-
ist, and politician.  Preisler, Paul W., OUR CAMPAIGNS, http://www.ourcampaigns. 
com/CandidateDetail.html?CandidateID=158585 (last modified Aug. 27, 2011).  
Preisler filed Doherty, his first redistricting suit, while he was a student at the St. 
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bestowed upon the General Assembly and other redistricting authorities,
109
 
the Supreme Court of Missouri has consistently given these authorities a wide 
berth in drawing district maps.
110
  In particular, the court has delineated fac-
tors and circumstances that permit the legislature to depart from the standard 
of compactness proffered by Barrett. 
At issue in Preisler v. Doherty was the 1952 redistricting of the City of 
St. Louis.
111
  The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of St. Louis 
(the Board) had divided the city into seven state senatorial districts.
112
  Plain-
tiffs brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the districts’ validi-
ty.
113
  Instead of the state legislature drawing the new districts, it was the 
Board that was charged with the duty.
114
  However, it was still confined to the 
same standard as the General Assembly: that the districts be as compact as 
may be.
115
  The Supreme Court of Missouri found that none of the districts 
were physically compact, describing one as “T-shaped” and another as “L-
shaped.”
116
  Speaking to the power of the redistricting authority to depart 
from the standard of compactness, the court stated: 
[C]ourts may not interfere with the wide discretion which the Legisla-
ture has in making apportionments for establishing such districts when 
legislative discretion has been exercised.  It is only when constitution-
al limitations placed upon the discretion of the Legislature have been 
wholly ignored and completely disregarded in creating districts that 
courts will declare them to be void.
117
 
The court listed factors that might justify a departure from compactness, in-
cluding the observation of political subdivisions, attempts to obtain popula-
tion equality, and natural boundary lines.
118
  However, the court found that, in 
creating the districts at issue in Doherty, none of these factors were relied 
  
Louis University School of Law.  Id.  He died in 1971, while Kirkpatrick was still 
being litigated.  Id. 
 109. While the General Assembly is charged with congressional redistricting, 
different authorities conduct state legislative redistricting.  See supra note 52 and 
accompanying text. 
 110. See generally Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422; Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552; 
Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 431.  
 111. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 430. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. In situations where a county was allotted more than one senator, former 
Article III, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution delegated districting of the county 
to local authorities.  MO. CONST. art. III, § 8 (repealed 1966).  
 115. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d at 432. 
 116. Id. at 432-33, 437. 
 117. Id. at 431. 
 118. Id. at 432, 434. 
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upon.
119
  “[D]epartures from compactness were not made to obtain equality of 
population, [and] the departures from ward lines in making districts were not 
used to obtain compactness,” the court wrote, but instead “aided in making 
them less compact, more irregular, longer and narrower.”
120
  The Board’s 
departure from compactness in drawing the districts was not justified by any 
acceptable factor, and as a result the court found that the Board abused its 
discretion and the districts were rendered invalid.
121
 
The next Missouri case to take up the issue, Preisler v. Hearnes, arose 
as a result of congressional redistricting.
122
  The plaintiff claimed that the 
1961 Act dividing the state into new congressional districts resulted in a lack 
of compactness, rendering the Act unconstitutional.
123
  Among his com-
plaints, the plaintiff suggested that greater compactness could be achieved by 
dividing counties.
124
  The court emphatically dismissed this argument, and in 
doing so stressed the importance of keeping counties united.
125
  “[C]ounties 
are important governmental units, in which the people are accustomed to 
working together.  Therefore, it has always been the policy of this state, in 
creating districts of more than one county (congressional, judicial or senatori-
al) to have them composed of entire counties.”
126
  In short, the Hearnes court 
placed great emphasis on the preservation of political subdivisions – in this 
case, counties – in redistricting efforts.
127
 
Despite the holding that county boundaries were important to the com-
pactness inquiry, the court in Hearnes again affirmed that the General As-
sembly had wide latitude in adhering to the rule.
128
  It declared that “urban 
conditions” could justify dividing counties, noting that this was the case in 
the 1961 Act with respect to counties in both Kansas City and St. Louis, the 
state’s two largest cities.
129
  And while the court took the same stance that it 
did in Doherty regarding legislative discretion – stating that the General As-
sembly has a large berth in apportioning the districts – it used even stronger 
language in doing so.
130
  The court acknowledged that the tenth district was 
not in fact reasonably compact and that it could have been made more com-
pact by adding two additional counties.
131
  Yet, it still found the 1961 Act 
  
 119. Id. at 434. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 435. 
 122. Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Mo. 1962) (en banc). 
 123. Id.  Plaintiff also made an argument regarding the disparity in population 
among the districts.  Id.  
 124. Id. at 556. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 557. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 555. 
 131. Id. at 557. 
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constitutional.
132
  In explaining this counterintuitive result, the court under-
scored the importance of legislative discretion.
133
  It stated: 
Very likely each legislator individually would draw somewhat differ-
ent district lines. Therefore, any redistricting agreed upon must always 
be a compromise. Mathematical exactness is not required or in fact ob-
tainable and a compromise, for which there is any reasonable basis, is 
an exercise of legislative discretion that the courts must respect.
134
 
The court in Hearnes thus went beyond the Doherty court, suggesting that 
even if a district is unequivocally noncompact (as was true of the tenth dis-
trict), as long as a reasonable basis for the deviation existed – in Hearnes, 
greater equality of population – the fact that a district is not as compact as 
possible will not render a map unconstitutional.
135
 
The most recent case
136
 interpreting Missouri’s compactness provision 
resulted from state senatorial redistricting conducted in the wake of the 1970 
decennial census.
137
  In Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, the sole question presented on 
appeal was whether the districts were as compact as may be.
138
  As in 
Hearnes, the Supreme Court of Missouri conceded that at least one district 
did not completely meet the compactness requirement.
139
  In addition, the 
court agreed that the changes to the districts proposed by the plaintiffs would 
in fact make some districts more compact.
140
  Nevertheless, the court did not 
find the districts unconstitutional.
141
 
In upholding the district map, the Kirkpatrick court drew upon the hold-
ing in Hearnes and once again emphasized legislative discretion.
142
  The 
court reiterated that the redistricting authority is inevitably made up of     
“fallible human beings” and that no districts are perfectly compact or without 
  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. While Preisler v. Kirkpatrick is the most recent Missouri case bearing on   
the court’s decision in Pearson II, there has been other recent litigation arising from 
the state’s redistricting.  On May 25, 2012 – the same day the Pearson II opinion   
was published – the court also handed down its decision in Johnson v. State. 366 
S.W.3d 11 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).  Like Pearson II, Johnson also stemmed from con-
gressional redistricting.  Id. at 16.  However, as the court in Pearson II does not con-
sider the Johnson holding in rendering its decision, Johnson will not be further ana-
lyzed in this Note. 
 137. Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. 1975) (en banc), over-
ruled by Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 138. Id. at 424 (quoting MO. CONST. art. III, § 5). 
 139. Id. at 426. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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room for improvement.
143
  Except in rare occasions where districts take       
on naturally compact shapes, such as circles or squares, meandering county 




The court also expanded upon the scope of this discretion, clarifying 
how its abuses would be measured.
145
  In highlighting its finding that the 
redistricting commission made “an honest and good faith effort” in construct-
ing the districts, the court appeared to suggest that there was a subjective 
element in assessing whether legislative discretion was violated.
146
  The court 
also held that because the districts substantially complied with the compact-
ness requirement, they were constitutionally sound.
147
  Therefore, not only 
did the court in Kirkpatrick imply that the General Assembly must act in 
good faith in adhering to the compactness requirement, it also suggested that 
this standard must only be substantially met in order to pass constitutional 
muster.
148
  However, this language was largely dismissed by Pearson II, 
which chose to interpret the compactness requirement in a way that negated 
legislative good faith as a consideration.
149
  Instead, the court in Pearson II 
intimated that legislative discretion permitted the creation of noncompact 
districts, as long as such lack of compactness could be justified by “mandato-
ry and permissible” factors.
150
 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs ultimately asserted that the trial court failed 
in finding the Map valid under the standard of compactness articulated in 
Article III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution.
151
  In particular, Plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of districts 3, 5, and 6.
152
  Before examining 
the characteristics of these contested districts, the court first addressed Plain-
tiffs’ other claims: that the trial court’s failure to shift the burden to Defend-
ants to justify the Map’s departures from compactness was an error
153
 and 




 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. at 427. 
 148. Id. at 426-427. 
 149. See Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 45-46 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 150. See id. at 41. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 52. 
 153. Id. at 45. This claim was only raised by one set of plaintiffs: the McClatchey 
plaintiffs.  Id.  
 154. Id. at 42-43. 
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Plaintiffs asserted that, under Missouri law, after a plaintiff makes a 
showing that a district could be more compact the burden shifts to the state   
to prove “why the district is not substantially more compact.”
155
  The court 
dismissed this reasoning, affirming that the burden never shifts from the 
plaintiff and emphasizing that Plaintiffs erroneously based their argument on 
the federal standard, which incorporates a good faith burden-shifting frame-
work.
156
  The court stated, “It is Plaintiffs who seek a declaration that the 
Map is unconstitutional, and shifting the burden of proof conflicts with their 




Having resolved Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the burden of proof, the 
court took up its examination of the compactness requirement.  The court 
observed that the issue raised by Plaintiffs – whether the districts are as com-
pact as may be – is a mixed question of law and fact.
158
  While the meaning 
of the constitutional language at issue is a legal determination, whether the 
Map adheres to that standard is a question of fact.
159
  As such, it was neces-
sary that the court use two different standards of review and analyze the   
issues separately.
160
   
Turning first to the meaning of compactness, the court noted that it 
would be reviewed de novo.
161
  The language of Article III, section 45 states 
in pertinent part: 
When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled in 
the House of the Congress of the United States under the census . . . is 
certified to the governor, the general assembly shall by law divide the 
state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to 
which it is entitled, which districts shall be composed of contiguous 
territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.
162
 
The court recognized that the standard “as compact . . . as may be,” as con-
tained within this provision, is comprised of two distinct parts: “compact” and 
“as may be.”
163
  Examining the word “compact,” the court invoked the inter-
pretation supplied in Barrett, declaring it to mean “closely united territo-
  
 155. Id. at 45. 
 156. Id. at 46.  See supra Part III.A. 
 157. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 46 (quoting Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 33 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc)). 
 158. Id. at 47. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 48; see also City of Arnold v. Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Mo. 
2008) (en banc) (“[T]his Court reviews a trial court’s interpretation of the Missouri 
constitution de novo.”). 
 162. MO. CONST. art. III, § 45. 
 163. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 48. 
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ry.”
164
  Other than to say that this definition “does not refer solely to physical 
shape or size” and that “a visual observation . . . is not a decisive factor,” the 
court did not provide many clues as to the definition.
165
  Instead, the court 
suggested that the phrase “as may be” gives meaning to “compact,” stating 
that “[a] determination of whether a district fails to satisfy the requirement 
cannot be accomplished solely by inquiring if it is ‘compact,’ because the 
modifier ‘as may be’ alters the meaning of that word.”
166
  According to the 
court, “as may be” has a dual effect.
167
  It conveys that “compactness” is not a 
standard that can be met with complete precision, and it grants the legislature 
the power to consider other recognized factors, such as those set out in 
Doherty, Hearnes, and Kirkpatrick.
168
  The court stated, “This Court’s prece-
dent does not hold that constitutional requirements can be disregarded to con-
sider other factors but instead recognizes that the constitutional requirements 
themselves incorporate such considerations by use of the standard ‘as may 
be.’”
169
  Such factors implicitly authorized for legislative consideration in-
clude “population density; natural boundary lines; the boundaries of political 
subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, and precincts; and the histor-
ical boundary lines of prior redistricting maps.”
170
 
Furthermore, the court recognized other factors that can affect the   
compactness of districts, such as “the interrelationship in standards for   
population equality and compactness requirements . . . the contiguity re-
quirement . . . [and] federal laws.”
171
  According to the court, consideration of 
these factors means that, even if a district does not appear to be composed    
of closely united territory, it could still satisfy the constitutional compactness 
requirement.
172
  Having thus declared the meaning of Missouri’s compactness 
provision, the court proceeded to the question of fact: whether districts 3, 5, 
and 6 satisfied this standard.  In making this determination, the court re-
viewed the trial court’s findings of fact regarding the characteristics of the 





 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 48-49. 
 166. Id. at 48. 
 167. Id. at 49. 
 168. Id.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 169. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 51. 
 170. Id. at 50. 
 171. Id. at 53. 
 172. Id. at 51. 
 173. Id. at 44, 52; see also White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 308 (Mo. 
2010) (en banc) (“When evidence is contested by disputing a fact in any manner, this 
Court defers to the trial court’s determination of credibility.”). 
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A.  District 3 
Applying the reasoning articulated above, the court examined the fea-
tures of district 3, focusing on its shape.
174
  Districts 1 and 2, which lie to the 
east of most areas of district 3, were drawn in circular forms; as a result, dis-
trict 3 took on what the court described as a “crescent shape.”
175
  Plaintiffs 
took issue with district 3’s boundary lines, which they considered to be highly 
suspect due to the meandering nature of the boundaries.
176
  However, accord-
ing to evidence presented at trial, the shape of districts 1 and 2 could be at-
tributed to an attempt to “protect[] against minority ‘vote dilution’” and thus 
comply with the Voting Rights Act.
177
  Therefore, the court recognized that 
while district 3 did have an unusual shape, its deviations from compactness 
were the result of a recognized factor: adherence to the Voting Rights Act.
178
  
The court found that the trial court did not err in holding that Plaintiffs failed 




B.  Districts 5 and 6 
 
The court’s analysis of district 5 required a more in-depth examination 
of the facts than did its analysis of district 3.  While it conceded that the fac-
tual record showed a dispute regarding whether the deviations in district 5’s 
boundaries were “minimal and practical,” the court ultimately determined that 
the trial court was correct in holding that Plaintiffs failed to show that district 
5 did not meet the compactness requirement.
180
  The court first examined the 
shape of district 5, stating that, while it was not necessarily physically com-
pact, it met the standard advanced in Barrett in that it was closely united terri-
tory.
181
  In regards to legislative discretion, both Plaintiffs’ expert and De-
fendants’ expert admitted at trial that there was “no bright line between a 
compact and non-compact district.”
182
  Echoing the court’s statement in 
Hearnes that mathematical precision cannot be achieved, Defendants present-
  
 174. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 54. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); see also id. at 43      
app. A. 
 177. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 54; see Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(2006).  See supra note 72 for further discussion of the Voting Rights Act. 
 178. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 53-54.  Missouri courts have held that the Voting 
Rights Act is a recognized factor justifying deviations from compactness.  See John-
son v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11, 27 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“A valid map must comply 
with the Voting Rights Act.”). 
 179. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 54. 
 180. Id. at 56. 
 181. Id. at 55. 
 182. Id. at 55-56. 
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ed testimony that statistical measures, while useful, could not conclusively 
establish a map’s compactness.
183
  The court proceeded to evaluate the evi-
dence presented to the trial court regarding the General Assembly’s use of 
recognized factors in deviating from compactness.
184
  The court reviewed 
evidence of both historical boundary lines and the boundaries of political 
subdivisions.
185
  It noted that a portion of Jackson County had historically 
been carved out of district 5, and that the Map only slightly expanded that 
section.
186
  Concerning the political subdivisions, the court stated that while 
some were divided, others were maintained.
187
  It further suggested that the 
General Assembly could have had a reasonable basis for drawing the bounda-
ries the way it did, in that a greater portion of Kansas City was kept intact, a 
factor that the court deemed “legitimate.”
188
  Ultimately, the court deferred to 
the trial court’s evaluation of these facts, holding that its judgment was not 
against the weight of the evidence.
189
  The court made a similar finding re-
garding district 6, stating that “because the boundary in district 5 has a direct 
correlation to the boundary in district 6, the same analysis applies.”
190
 
C.  The Holding 
Finding no error in the trial court’s conclusions regarding the compact-
ness of districts 3, 5, and 6, the court affirmed the judgments.
191
  The court 
held the Map valid under the standard set forth in Article III, section 45 of the 
Missouri Constitution, stating that “the standard does not require absolute 
precision in compactness and because mandatory and permissible recognized 
factors can impact the configuration of district boundaries . . . plaintiffs do 




D.  The Dissent 
In his dissent, Judge William Ray Price, Jr. disputed the majority’s 
claim that the Map met the standard articulated in Article III, section 45.
193
  
In disputing the compactness of the challenged districts, Judge Price took 
  
 183. Id. at 55; see Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. 1962) (en banc). 
 184. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 56. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 41. 
 193. Id. at 84. 
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particular issue with the shapes of districts 5 and 6.
194
  Describing the districts 
as “bizarrely shaped,” he asserted that their “visually jarring” borders divided 
communities; specifically, the cities of Blue Springs, Independence, Lee’s 
Summit, and Oak Grove, each of which was placed in two different districts 
as a result of the Map.
195
  While Judge Price recognized that the General As-
sembly is allowed discretion in redistricting, he emphasized that Article III, 
section 45 was enacted to place limits on that discretion.
196
  He stated, “Dis-
cretionary factors cannot be read into the constitutional fabric if doing so 
would functionally erase the requirement that districts be compact.”
197
  Final-
ly, Judge Price emphasized the importance of preserving the integrity of the 
voting process through redistricting.
198
  Maintaining that the majority’s deci-
sion undermined this objective, he stated:  
Abstract discussion of law cannot mask the obvious fact that the legis-
lature has attempted to gerrymander a teardrop-shaped portion of 
Jackson County from district 5 and place it in district 6.  Article III, 
section 45 is simply and clearly written.  It should be enforced, not fi-
nessed in deference to an obvious legislative shenanigan.
199
 




V.  COMMENT 
Pearson II continues down the path of prior precedent, interpreting Arti-
cle III, section 45 of the Missouri Constitution in a way that provides little 
check against obvious attempts at political gerrymandering.  The court ech-
oed Missouri precedent in declaring “compact” to mean “closely united terri-
tory” and in listing the factors that may justify a deviation from this standard, 
including political and historical boundary lines, urban conditions, and popu-
lation equality.
201
  Pearson II also continues a concerning trend in finding 
that a district that is decidedly noncompact is nonetheless “as compact . . . as 
may be” under the Missouri standard. 
While there are situations in which factors may give grounds for a dis-
trict’s departure from the notion of compactness, through its decision in Pear-
son II the Supreme Court of Missouri has lowered the level of compliance 
  
 194. Id. at 78. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 75. 
 197. Id. at 74 (citing Buechner v. Bond, 650 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo. 1983)          
(en banc)). 
 198. Id. at 84. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id.  
 201. See id. at 48-50. 
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needed to meet this standard to a degree that undermines the ultimate purpose 
for which the compactness provision was put into place: to prevent gerry-
mandering.
202
  Maintaining close adherence to the standard of compactness is 
especially important because federal protections against political gerryman-
dering are nearly nonexistent.
203
  As a last line of defense against such politi-
cal vote dilution, Missouri’s judiciary should interpret the provision in a way 
that strengthens, rather than weakens, the standard of compactness. 
Part A of this section will examine the importance of Missouri’s com-
pactness requirement in preventing political gerrymandering, while Part B 
will take the position that Pearson II has weakened this requirement such that 
it no longer fulfills the purposes for which it was adopted.
204
  Finally, Part C 
will argue that, in situations in which districts fail to satisfy the standard of 
compactness, courts must impose a good faith standard on the General As-
sembly to ensure greater protection against attempts at gerrymandering.
205
 
A.  The Importance of Compactness in Preventing Gerrymandering 
The U.S. Constitution imposes limited restrictions on state redistricting 
efforts.
206
  In doing so, it advances a “one person, one vote” principle that 
seeks to prevent vote dilution and ensure that every person’s vote is as nearly 
equal in value as possible.
207
  In determining whether a redistricting map vio-
lates this standard, courts use equality of population among the districts as 
their measuring stick.
208
  In cases in which a court finds that a redistricting 
body has not made a good faith effort to achieve population equality, maps 
are rendered invalid.
209
  However, federal courts provide little redress beyond 
this point.
210
  In 2004, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear 
the Pennsylvania redistricting case Vieth v. Jubelirer, holding that claims of 
political gerrymandering were nonjusticiable.
211
  The Court based its decision 
  
 202. See Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975) (en banc). 
 203. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (plu-
rality opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion); Radogno 
v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 5025251 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
21, 2011). 
 204. See infra Parts V.A, V.B. 
 205. See infra Part V.C. 
 206. Kemper, supra note 52, at 323.  The Voting Rights Act also imposes federal 
statutory restrictions on state redistricting.  Id.  For further discussion of the Voting 
Rights Act, see supra note 72. 
 207. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964). 
 208. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 568 (1964). 
 209. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969). 
 210. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 
(2006) (plurality opinion); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 211. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281.  The Court also distinguished claims of political ger-
rymandering from those of racial gerrymandering.  Id. at 285-86.  It noted that claims 
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on a lack of “judicially discernable and manageable standards” for adjudicat-
ing this type of claim.
212
  The Court reaffirmed this position two years later in 
another plurality decision, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 
(LULAC), explaining that there was still a dispute over which substantive 
standard to apply.
213
  The upshot of the decisions rendering these cases 
nonjusticiable is that questionable redistricting plans may be able to survive 
federal claims of political gerrymandering.
214
 
The potential ramifications of these decisions on Missouri courts can be 
seen in Pearson I.
215
  In addition to their assertion that districts did not meet 
the compactness requirement, Plaintiffs also brought a partisan vote dilution 
claim.
216
  Dismissing this argument, the court referenced the uncertainty sur-
rounding political gerrymandering claims evidenced by the decisions in both 
Vieth and LULAC.
217
  The court stated, “In light of the Supreme Court’s ina-
bility to state a clear standard . . . this Court is unable to find that Plaintiffs 
have shown an entitlement to relief at this time.”
218
  The court’s dismissal of 
this claim in Pearson I demonstrates the lack of federal protections against 
gerrymandering in Missouri.
219
  As a result, state limitations on legislative 
discretion are rendered even more necessary. 
Due to a lack of federal protection against gerrymandering, Missouri’s 
compactness provision provides an important second line of defense.
220
  As 
districts drawn for partisan purposes often tend to take on irregular shapes, a 
compactness requirement is a natural check on the power of the General As-
sembly to consider political motives in its redistricting efforts.
221
  Both Pear-
  
of racial gerrymandering are justiciable, but are rare and seldom encountered.  Id. at 
286. 
 212. Id. at 281. 
 213. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 413-14. 
 214. Laughlin Mcdonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially 
Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 243 (2009).  In a more recent decision, the Northern District 
of Illinois described the effect that Vieth and its successors have had on adjudication 
of gerrymandering claims, aptly stating that the decisions “place district courts in the 
untenable position of evaluating [these] claims without any definitive standards.”  
Radogno v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:11-cv-04884, 2011 WL 5025251, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 215. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 41-42 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 216. Id. at 41.   
 217. Id. at 41-42. 
 218. Id. at 42. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975) (en banc). 
 221. See Kemper, supra note 52, at 323 n.8.  The importance of compactness in 
preventing gerrymandering is perhaps underscored by the origin of the word.  It “de-
rives from ‘the fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped 
outline of an election district in northeastern (Massachusetts) that had been formed for 
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son II and the Missouri precedent on which it was based consistently extol the 
virtues of the compactness requirement and proclaim its importance in pre-
venting gerrymandering.
222
  The stance taken by Pearson II can be traced 
back to the court in Barrett, which stated that the purpose of Missouri’s com-
pactness provision was “to guard, as far as practicable, under the system of 
representation adopted, against a legislative evil, commonly known as the 
‘gerrymander,’ and to require the Legislature to form districts, not only of 
contiguous, but of compact or closely united, territory.”
223
  However, the 
scope of legislative discretion allowed to the General Assembly by the court 
in Pearson II both compromises the provision and undermines its purpose. 
B.  The Weakening Effect of Pearson II 
In holding that the districts in question satisfied Missouri’s constitution-
al compactness requirement,
224
 the Pearson II court interpreted the require-
ment so loosely as to neutralize the purposes for which it was added, a deci-
sion that may subsequently render the state more susceptible to partisan ger-
rymandering.  In its 1912 opinion, the Barrett court spoke to the subjective 
mindset of the framers in adopting the compactness requirement, stating: 
[It] was not [their] intention . . . to confer upon the Legislature the un-
limited power and discretion to form the districts in such shapes and 
dimensions as it might, in its own opinion, deem proper . . . . Had the 
framers of the Constitution intended that the Legislature should appor-
tion the state into districts according to its own free and untrammeled 
will, then they would not have used the words of restriction . . . .
225
 
The court’s recent decision in Pearson II, however, demonstrates the erosion 
that a century of redistricting litigation has wreaked on the framers’ intent.   
In deeming constitutional those districts with highly questionable compact-
ness, the Pearson II court has significantly weakened the strength of the 
compactness requirement. 
In Pearson II, the court observed that recognized factors may justify 
“minimal and practical” deviations from compactness.
226
  Deviations are 
hardly “minimal,” however, when both the court and counsel for the state 
  
partisan purposes in 1812 during (Elbridge) Gerry’s governorship.’”  Id. (quoting 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969)). 
 222. See Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 74, 84 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); State ex rel. 
Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 (1912). 
 223. Barrett, 146 S.W. at 61 (quoting People ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 
N.E. 307, 315 (Ill. 1895)). 
 224. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 225. Id. at 54. 
 226. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 48-49 (emphasis added). 
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concede that the districts at issue were noncompact.
227
  Indeed, in Pearson I, 
the court acknowledged Plaintiffs’ statement that districts 3 and 5 were “par-
ticularly suspect,” stating that this “can be confirmed by any rational and 
objective consideration of their boundaries.”
228
  The record provides an even 
stronger indictment of the “compactness” of these two districts.  Referring to 
district 5, counsel for the state declared at trial, “[F]rankly, I’m not going to 
stand here and defend the compactness of District 5.  [It] seems to me to be 
problematic.”
229
  In fact, district 5 – described by the dissent as “L-shaped” – 
has a width “so narrow that it almost breaks the district’s congruity.”
230
  
When describing district 3 the state stated, “What you have in District 3 is . . . 
something that’s fairly compact.”
231
  Despite admitting departures from com-
pactness, the court found these two districts, along with district 6, to be con-
stitutional under the “as compact . . . as may be” standard.
232
 
Judge Price, in his dissenting opinion in Pearson II, took issue with the 
majority declaring districts to be compact which, in his view, were               
so noncompact as to be “visually jarring.”
233
  He noted that the districts    
split communities in half, tore apart cities, and divided counties.
234
  Judge 
Price further stated, “Abstract discussion of law cannot mask the obvious fact     
that the legislature has attempted to gerrymander . . . [Article III,              




In upholding a Map comprised of districts drawn with such questionable 
compactness, the court in Pearson II thus demonstrates an interpretation of 
the compactness requirement that runs directly contrary to the intent of the 
framers of the provision.
236
  The General Assembly was given such a wide 
berth of discretion in its redistricting efforts that decidedly noncompact dis-
tricts were able to slip through the cracks.  In order to combat this concerning 
trend, upon a finding of noncompactness to the degree of those districts in 
Pearson II, the General Assembly must be required to justify these deviations 
in some manner if the districts are to be upheld.  By sapping the compactness 
provision of much of its strength, the court has created a risk that, without the 
addition of a standard of accountability, legislative discretion will continue to 
go largely unchecked. 
  
 227. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 40 n.2. 
 230. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 72 (Price, J., dissenting). 
 231. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d at 40 n.2. 
 232. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 53-56. 
 233. Id. at 78 (Price, J., dissenting). 
 234. Id. (Price, J., dissenting). 
 235. Id. at 84 (Price, J., dissenting). 
 236. See State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 61 (1912) (quoting Peo-
ple ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 315 (Ill. 1895)). 
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C.  The Necessity of a Good Faith Standard 
If the Missouri judiciary is going to allow such a wide berth in state re-
districting, it needs to ensure that there is a framework in place to hold the 
General Assembly, or redistricting commissions, accountable for gross devia-
tions from compactness.  Federal courts incorporate such a system: once a 
plaintiff has established population differences (here, noncompactness) that 
did not result from a good faith effort to achieve equality, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to justify the deviation.
237
  The U.S. Supreme Court in Karcher 
v. Daggett describes this burden-shifting model: 
First, the court must consider whether the population differences 
among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a 
good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population.  Parties chal-
lenging apportionment legislation must bear the burden of proof on 
this issue . . . .  If . . . the plaintiffs can establish that the population 
differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve equali-
ty, the State must bear the burden of proving that each significant var-




While Missouri courts have never adopted such a good faith burden-shifting 
framework, the Supreme Court of Missouri has previously implied that    
good faith is relevant to matters of redistricting.
239
  In Kirkpatrick, the court 
stated, “[T]he Commission made an honest and good faith effort to construct 
senatorial districts as compact as may be.”
240
  While not expressly adopting 
the federal standard, the court appeared to be leaning towards an interpreta-
tion of the compactness provision that would impose more accountability    
on the redistricting authority by requiring the defendant to justify deviations 
from compactness. 
This momentum was brought to an abrupt halt in Pearson I.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court of Missouri abrogated the good faith portion of the 
Kirkpatrick decision.
241
  The court reaffirmed this overruling in Pearson II.
242
  
It was a mistake by the court in Pearson II to dismiss the language used in 
  
 237. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983); see generally Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (holding that equal protection requires the 
State to “make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable”); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969) 
(finding that Missouri did not “satisfactorily justif[y] the population variances among 
the districts”). 
 238. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730-31. 
 239. See Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Mo. 1975) (en banc). 
 240. Id. (emphasis added). 
 241. Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39-40 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 242. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d 36, 45-46 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
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Kirkpatrick without first considering its merits.  In blindly adhering to prece-
dent and declaring the subjective mindset of the legislature “irrelevant” under 
the Missouri Constitution,
243
 the court failed to acknowledge that it was fully 
within its discretion to interpret the compactness requirement in a way that 
incorporates a burden-shifting standard.  In his dissenting opinion in Kirkpat-
rick, Judge Finch proposed such a standard.  He stated: 
Appellants have offered no evidence to justify the lack of compactness 
in any of these districts, nor to demonstrate any reason why the com-
mission could not have complied with the requirements . . . .  In my 




Had this opinion controlled, a good faith burden-shifting standard would have 
been introduced into Missouri courts. 
Furthermore, Missouri would not have been the only state to adopt such 
a standard.  Courts in both Iowa and New Jersey have interpreted their state 
compactness provisions to require burden shifting, even though neither state’s 
constitution mandates such a framework.
245
  The Iowa Supreme Court has 
stated that “[t]he goal of any apportioning authority must be to provide for 
equality of population and territorial compactness as nearly as practicable.”
246
  
When claims are brought challenging the compactness of districts, the Iowa 
Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution to require the legislature 
to show why it could not comply with the standard.
247
  Likewise, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has held that, when faced with a deviation from the 
standard set forth in constitutional redistricting provisions, the state bears the 
burden of justifying it.
248
  Maryland also shifts the burden in cases of redis-
tricting, utilizing a framework similar to that employed by federal courts.
249
  
Citing federal precedent, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that if, after 
a hearing, sufficient evidence is presented to “preclude a finding that [a map 





 243. Id. at 46. 
 244. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d at 436 (Finch, J., dissenting). 
 245. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 46-47, 47 n.6; see In re Legislative Districting of 
Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Iowa 1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 262 A.2d 
389, 395 (N.J. 1970). 
 246. In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d at 791. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Jackman, 262 A.2d at 395.  These constitutional provisions include a com-
pactness requirement.  Id. at 394. 
 249. Pearson II, 367 S.W.3d at 47, 47 n.7; see In re Legislative Districting of 
State, 805 A.2d 292, 306 (Md. 2002). 
 250. In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d at 306 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court of Appeals of Maryland is the state’s highest court.  
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While there is no state constitutional or statutory authority imposing      
a good faith standard on Missouri courts, judicial precedent in other states 
suggests that it would not be outside the court’s authority to adopt this      
system.  If the court would apply such a good faith, burden-shifting frame-
work, it could strengthen the standard it weakened in Pearson II and in doing 
so advance the ultimate goal of Missouri’s compactness requirement: to en-
sure that every person’s vote is granted equal weight.
251
  In Pearson I, the 
court stated that “the duty to draw the district lines of a contiguous territory as 
compact . . . as may be is one that is mandatory and objective, not subjec-
tive.”
252
  However, by not imposing any accountability on the General As-
sembly, the Supreme Court of Missouri is allowing its subjective whims to 
remain perilously unchecked. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Pearson II is the last in a line of Missouri cases that have steadily loos-
ened the compactness requirement and, in repeatedly denying a good faith 
standard, continuously refused to hold the redistricting body accountable for 
its decisions.  Rendering this trend even more distressing is the lack of federal 
redress for claims of gerrymandering.  Missouri’s compactness provision was 
intended to provide a second line of defense; yet the state’s judiciary has in-
stead lent its muscle to the legislature, strengthening its discretion while 
weakening the objective constraints on such exercises of power.  In order to 
protect against political vote dilution, it is critical that Article III, section 45 
be interpreted in a way that requires the General Assembly to justify its de-
viations from compactness. 
 
  
 251. See Pearson I, 359 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)). 
 252. Id. at 40. 
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